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Abstract
We study a continuous time model of a levered firm with fixed assets generating a
cash flow which fluctuates with business conditions. Since external finance is costly, the
firm holds a liquid (cash) reserve to help survive periods of poor business conditions.
Holding liquid assets inside the firm is costly as some of the return on such assets is
dissipated due to agency problems. We solve for the firms optimal dividend, share
issuance, and liquid asset holding policies.
The firm optimally targets a level of liquid assets which is a non-monotonic function
of business conditions. In good times, the firm does not need a high liquidity reserve,
but as conditions deteriorate, it will target higher reserve. In very poor conditions, the
firm will declare bankruptcy, usually after it has depleted its liquidity reserve.
Our model can predict liquidity holdings, leverage ratios, yield spreads, expected
default probabilities, expected loss given default and equity volatilities all in line with
market experience.
We apply the model to examine agency conflicts associated with the liquidity re-
serve, and some associated debt covenants. We see that a restrictive covenant applied
to the liquidity reserve will often enhance the debt value as well as the equity value.
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A Model of Corporate Liquidity
“Kerkorian’s numbers just don’t add up,” said Nicholas Lobaccaro, an auto an-
alyst with S G Warburg. “Ford says it needs double-digit billions of cash to
survive the next downturn in the market. General Motors says it wants to put
aside $13-15 billion. How can anyone believe Kerkorian when he says $2 billion
is enough?”[for Chrysler] 1
1 Introduction
The quotation above illustrates the range of opinions that can be found among practitioners
about the levels of liquid assets that are appropriate for firms. This observation is not an
isolated case - it is often remarked that many large corporations carry surprisingly large
amounts of cash on their balance sheets. However, finance theory has given very little
quantitative guidance as to how much cash is enough. In this paper we attempt to fill this
gap by directly asking what is the optimal proportion of the firm’s assets that should be held
in liquid form? In attempting to answer this question, we recognize that desirable levels of
cash holding may change over time according to business conditions. This leads us to couch
our analysis in an explicitly dynamic setting. Furthermore, we recognize that views about
what is optimal may naturally differ according to the agent’s point of view–the cash holding
policy which maximizes share value may not necessarily maximize the value of the firm.
The main features of our analysis and our main findings can be summarized as follows.
We consider a levered firm with assets in place which generate a random revenue cash flow.
Fluctuations of business conditions are captured by supposing that the rate of revenue flows
is a stochastic process which reverts toward a long-term mean. Earnings after flow costs and
servicing debt may be paid out as dividends or may be retained within the firm as liquid
assets. The firm faces the threat of possible bankruptcy which arises if there is a spell of low
cash flows that is sufficiently low or long-lasting as to exhaust all available liquid assets and
to make issuance of additional securities infeasible. We assume bankruptcy takes a simple
form, with creditors being awarded the value of the firm’s assets minus bankruptcy costs
and shareholders receiving nothing. Thus one of the objectives in holding a stock of liquid
1Sunday Times of London, April 23, 1995. This quote refers to the attempt by Kirk Kekorian to take over
Chrysler Motors arguing that in doing so he could increase shareholder value by returning most of Chrysler’s
$7.5 billon cash reserve to shareholders.
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assets is as a precaution against a downturn in business conditions which could threaten to
wipe out all shareholder value. However, holding liquid assets inside the firm is costly as
some of the return on such assets is dissipated, as there is the tendency that they will be
transformed in ways which are to the advantage of managers, but detrimental to investors.
The firm can also issue extra shares, but we assume that this is not perfectly efficient, due
to underwriting fees and agency costs.
In this setting we solve a dynamic program, to obtain the dividend/cash retention and
share issuance policy, which maximizes the value of equity. Also, we solve a similar program
to obtain the corresponding debt value. We find that in the optimal policy the firm will
target a level of liquid assets which varies according to the level of expected cash flows. This
optimal policy is not monotonic. In business conditions when the firm is comfortably solvent,
the firm does not need a high liquidity reserve, because it can expect the current favorable
conditions to continue for some time into the future. However, as conditions deteriorate, the
firm will target a higher level of liquid assets. As conditions deteriorate further, the firm will
target a higher liquidity reserve, but the actual liquidity holding will tend to be lower, as it
is being depleted by operating losses. In sufficiently poor conditions, the firm will declare
bankruptcy, after its liquidity reserve has been depleted to zero. In very poor conditions the
firm will declare bankrupt, even if it has a liquidity reserve, and then it will pay this reserve
out as a dividend to shareholders. Whether such a discrete liquidating dividend would be
legal, or whether it could be effectively prevented, are pertinent questions. We will also
analyze come covenants aimed at preventing such a discrete liquidating dividend.
We find that the optimal cash policy is sensitive to the basic parameters that affect the
values of debt and equity. The targeted level of cash is increasing in both the volatility of cash
flow and the costs of issuing new securities. Thus shareholders optimally maintain higher
levels of liquidity if they operate in less efficient capital markets; however, even reasonably
low costs of security issuance are sufficient for shareholders to optimally hold substantial
amounts of cash. Our model can also predict optimal leverage ratios, yield spreads, expected
default probabilities and expected loss given default all in line with market experience.
We apply our model to analyzing the agency conflict associated with the liquidity re-
serve, and some associated debt covenants. An agency conflict arises because this reserve is
determined so as to maximize the equity value, and this might be at the expense of the debt
value. The “first best” policy would be to maximize the firm value. We find that under the
first best policy, and for our benchmark parameter set, the firm will target a higher, not a
lower, level of liquidity reserve. This makes bankruptcy less likely, and so preserves the tax
shield and prevents bankruptcy costs, which fall on the debt holders. Also, the firm value is
substantially higher under the first best policy. But when bankruptcy costs are very small,
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and there is no tax shield, then maximizing the firm value rather than the equity value leaves
the liquidity reserve and the firm value much less changed. In this case the agency conflict
is not much associated with a destruction of economic value, but rather with a transfer of
wealth from the debt holders to the equity holders.
In light of this analysis, restrictive covenants aimed at reducing cash holding by firms
may be misguided. For example, a debt covenant restricting the size of the liquidity reserve
decreases the equity and firm values substantially in all cases studied. Such a covenant
thus might benefit the debt holders slightly, but at a substantial economic cost. It should be
emphasized that in our benchmark case we allow for a substantial conflict of interest between
shareholders and managers: we assume one third of interest income on cash held inside the
firm is extracted by insiders.
In contrast, we find more support for debt covenants aimed at limiting the firm’s ability
to pay out cash at times when the firm may be vulnerable. In particular, we find that
absent any restrictions to the contrary, in the face of poor business conditions the firm may
pay a large dividend, effectively plunging the firm into financial distress. When we consider
curbing this behavior by imposing a covenant prohibiting the firm from paying any dividend
at times when when it is not profitable, we find that firm value is increased significantly.
In fact, covenants restricting dividends when accounting profits are low are common in the
U.S. (See, Leuz et.al.)
We believe our analysis contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, we
have simultaneously solved for the firm’s optimal policies of cash holding, dividend payout,
and security issuance. Furthermore, we have carried out this analysis in a dynamic model
that is sufficiently rich to make realistic comparisons to a large number of quantitative
benchmarks. In particular, for our reference set of parameters we show the model generates
simultaneously realistic numbers for leverage, average cash holdings, equity volatility, yield
spreads, probability of default, and loss given default. We believe that the fact that our
model has been tied to realistic empirical benchmarks contributes to the credibility of our
qualitative conclusions regarding optimal policies and covenant restrictions. We will now
relate some of the key features of our analysis to previous literature.
Analysis of corporate holding of liquid assets goes back at least as far as Keynes (1936),
who identified a “precautionary” motive and a “business” (i.e., transactions) motive for such
holdings. Under the precautionary motive, the liquid assets are held to tide the firm over
hard times, and under the transactions motive liquidity is held to facilitate the financing of
investment opportunities which may occur in the future. The empirical study of corporate
liquidity holdings by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) provides some evidence
in support of the precautionary motive. These authors study the determinants and uses of
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liquidity holdings in a panel study of listed US firms. They show that firms tend to retain
a high proportion of their earnings as liquid reserves, and these reserves do not tend to be
used for capital investment, but tend to be depleted by operating losses.
Opler et. al. find that corporate liquidity holdings can be a significant proportion of the
firms value, averaging about 17% for their data set, which comprises all non-financial firms
reported in COMPUSTAT from 1971 - 1994. This result is in accord with previous studies,
for example by Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998). Opler et.al. argue that this high liquidity,
and the fact that it tends to be depleted by operating losses rather than capital acquisitions,
seems incompatible with the traditional static trade-off theory of capital structure. By
contrast, the “dynamic trade-off” model of the present paper is able to explain these effects.
Opler et. al. also present other empirical results which agree with the solution of our model
and which we will describe later. Recently, Ferreira and Vilela (2002) have extended the
work of Opler et al to a comparative study of 12 European economies.
Recently, Mello and Parsons (2000), and Rochet and Villeneuve (2004) have provided the-
oretical treatments of precautionary corporate liquidity holdings. The models of these papers
share some of the features of that of the present paper, including a firm with fixed produc-
tive asset, generating uncertain earnings, and with constraints on financing cash shortfalls,
motivating the liquidity holdings. Like the present paper, these papers show that there is a
liquidity target, below which the firm saves all earnings, and above which the firm pays out
all excessive liquidity as a dividend. The focus of these paper is largely to study the benefits
when the firm is allowed to hedge some of the uncertainty in its earnings2. They show that
hedging can enhance the firm’s value by reducing the optimal liquidity holding. We will
obtain a similar result below, in our framework. Also along similar lines, Acharya, Huang,
Subramaniam and Sundaram (2002) present a model of precautionary liquidity holding by
a levered firm. Their main concern is to study the interaction between holding the liquidity
reserve, and strategic debt service, and the credit spread.
A number of recent papers have studied the transactions motive for corporate liquidity
holding. These include Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2002), and Boyle and Guthrie
(2003). These papers show that financially constrained firms tend to hold liquidity deter-
mined by the relative values of current and prospective future investment opportunities.
Boyle and Guthrie show that a more constrained firm might rationally have a lower invest-
ment cash flow sensitivity, i.e. they invest a lower proportion of their earnings, than a less
constrained firm.
Also related to the present paper, Myers and Rajan (1998) highlight a fundamental trade-
2Rochet and Villeneuve also have a separate analysis concerning the demand for insurance against the
firm having to make a large payment, modelled as a Poisson jump.
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off of cost and benefits of liquidity when there are frictions in capital markets. On the one
hand holding liquid assets helps the firm avoid debt overhang problems or other aspects
of financial distress. On the other hand, keeping liquid assets within the firm increases the
chances that they will be transformed in ways that may be detrimental to investors. A similar
trade-off is present in our model. First, when security issuance is costly, maintaining liquid
assets is a means of reducing the chances of financial distress. Second, we model the cost of
holding liquid assets by assuming liquid assets held within the firm earn less than standard
money market rates. This wedge between return on inside funds and outside funds can
be viewed as a reduced form representation of agency costs incurred when insiders manage
to capture some of the value of financial slack. Myers and Rajan illustrate the tradeoff
between the two aspects of liquidity by calculating a firm’s debt capacity in a stylized 3-
period setting. In contrast our paper is devoted to characterizing the optimal liquid asset
holding in a steady-state continuous time model. 3
Our modelling of the firm is related to some recent continuous time analyses of corporate
debt valuation, in particular those of Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Anderson, Sun-
daresan and Tychon (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1996), Anderson and Sundaresan
(2000) and Huang and Huang (2002). The main difference in firm’s technology is that our
cash flow is mean reverting to reflect business conditions, whereas in these papers it is a
Geometric Brownian Motion. These papers focus on the optimal leverage, and the credit
spread, and they obtain analytic solutions to the model. Two recent contributions to this
field, which like the present paper use numerical solution techniques, are those of Broadie,
Chernov, and Sundaresan (2004) and Titman, Tompaidis and Tsyplakov (2004). The for-
mer studies the effects of alternative bankruptcy procedures on capital structure and firm
behavior. The latter includes a mean reverting aspect in modelling the business conditions,
as do we also. Our analysis of the agency problems associated with the liquidity reserve is
also parallel to an analysis of agency problems associated with leverage, in that paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model
and the technique we use to solve it. The model does not permit an analytical solution,
so in Section 2 we present the numerical solution for a benchmark case. In Section 3 we
present comparative statics with respect to the principal parameters, and discuss the results
obtained in the light of previous literature. In Section 4 we analyze the agency conflict
associated with the liquidity reserve, and the related debt covenants, and finally, in Section
5 we summarize our results and conclusions.
3A more distant relation to our paper is the analysis of Holmstrom-Tirole (1998). In their model, they
show that liquidity has the effect of reducing the likelihood of financial distress. However, their formal
analysis and the fundamental economic questions studied are very different from our analysis.
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2 The Model
2.1 Overview
Before presenting our model formally, it is useful to set out the main ideas in informal
terms. We consider a firm with a fixed asset in place which has been financed by equity and
long-term debt. The asset generates a random cash flow according to a stochastic process
whose drift is itself random and follows a mean-reverting process. Any cash flow in excess
of contractual debt service and fixed operating costs is subject to proportional corporate
income tax, and the after-tax residual may either be paid out as dividends, or retained as
liquid assets within the firm. Thus, the tax deductibility of interest debt service provides a
rationale for debt financing. Debt is assumed to be a hard claim, and any failure to meet
contractual debt service results in bankruptcy. We assume that strict priority is observed in
bankruptcy, with the firm’s assets in excess of bankruptcy costs being awarded to the firm’s
creditors. Shareholders lose all. When cash flows fall short of debt service, the firm may
draw-down its liquid assets. It may also issue new equity; however, this external finance is
costly so that the firm receives less than the full value of the shares it issues.
In this setting, firm faces two decisions. How much of the firm’s earnings should be paid
out as dividends? And how many new shares should be issued? Jointly, the two decisions will
determine the firm’s policy toward holding liquid assets. We assume that these decisions are
under the control of shareholders who maximize the value of equity, calculated as the present
discounted value of the future stream of dividends. Shareholders recognize that firm insiders
will to some degree use the liquid assets of the firm for their own benefit, thus reducing
the return on liquid assets. The firm’s decision will depend upon two state variables - the
current rate of cash flow and the current level of liquid assets. Since all the other features
of the environment are constant, this is a stationary problem. The solution of the model
involves solving for the optimal policy as a function of the two state variables.
The optimal dividend and share issuance strategy in this context will be of the ‘bang-bang’
type, under which the state space is divided into 3 regions: in the ‘save’ region zero dividend
is paid and earnings are accumulated in the reserve of liquid assets; in the ‘dividend’ region,
the liquid reserve is immediately paid out, until it is brought back to the ‘save’ region, or
to abandonment or bankruptcy; and in the ‘issue’ region, the firm immediately issues equity
until liquid reserve is brought back into the ‘save’ region. The solution to the problem
is studied by characterizing the boundaries between these regions as free boundaries, in a
dynamic program, which must be solved numerically. We now proceed to show how this
can be done, and later we will show how the solution changes in relation to changes in the
parameters of the model.
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2.2 Model Specification
The firm has fixed assets in place, which require maintenance/operating costs at a fixed rate
f , and which generate operating income at a rate dSt which follows the Ito equation
dSt = ρtdt+ σdW
σ
t , (2.1)
in which the expected revenue ρt at time t itself obeys the Ito equation
dρt = µ(ρt)dt+
√
ρtηdW
ρ
t . (2.2)
In these equations, dW σt and dW
ρ
t are infinitesimal increments of independent, standard
Brownian motions, and σ and η are constants. We model persistence in business conditions
by assuming that the drift function µ(ρt) exhibits mean reversion. We will discuss in detail
the choice of µ(ρ) when we consider the boundary conditions for the optimal policy. At this
stage it suffices to say that our choice is very close to being linear, with negative slope given
by −κ, so that the process ρt is mean reverting to ρ¯. The factor √ρt in the volatility term
of ρt prevents ρt from becoming negative. Note that after deducting the operating costs the
profitability of the fixed assets is given by dSt − fdt.
The firm is financed by equity and debt. We assume that the firm’s debt takes the form
of a perpetual bond promising a continuous payment at rate q. Also, the firm cannot alter
the amount of debt in issue, but it is allowed to issue more equity to cover interest payments
and operating losses, if this is feasible in terms of the price at which shares can be issued.
However, we assume that such equity issues will be inefficient, in that the firm will be able
to sell new shares at a fraction θ of their fair value. Costly security issuance (θ < 1) may be
due to a variety of contracting frictions and may vary systematically with the efficiency in
the capital markets where the firm operates. In a highly efficient market without frictions
or agency costs, θ will be close to unity; whereas in a very underdeveloped capital market
θ may be close to zero. We will see this parameter will have a large effect on the optimal
liquidity policy of the firm.
In addition to its fixed asset, the firm may hold a variable amount of liquid reserves.
At any time t, the value of these will be denoted by Ct. Liquid reserves held within the
firm will earn an ‘internal’ return at rate rin, which will be less than the riskless rate r
earned on outside funds. This wedge between rin and r reflects the moral hazard faced by
the shareholders, as discussed by Myers and Rajan (1998). The shareholders recognize that
the firms managers will be tempted to transform the liquid reserves for their own benefit,
and this is recognized as a reduction in the rate at which the liquidity reserve is assumed to
accumulate interest. The difference r − rin can be understood as the cost of holding liquid
8
assets by the firm. Under these assumptions, and for the time-being ignoring the possibility
of equity issues, the liquid reserve is the accumulation of total earnings net of dividends,
fixed costs, and interest payments on long-term debt, and interest at rin, and we can write
dCt = (1− τ)(dSt − (f + q)dt) + rinCtdt− dDt, (2.3)
where τ is the rate at which the operating income is taxed, and Dt is the accumulated
payment of dividends to the firm’s shareholders. This equation recognizes that tax is paid
on the operating income net of interest payments and fixed costs, i.e. dSt − (f + q)dt, and
if this negative, the equation recognizes a tax write-back on operating losses.
Finally, we assume the firm chooses the dividend policy so as to maximize equity value,
which is taken to be the present value of expected dividends discounted at the risk-free
rate r. The debt is also valued by discounting at the risk free rate the coupon payments
until bankruptcy. This is consistent with Equations (2.1), (2.2) referring to risk the neutral
probability measure. The basic risk elements in the model are represented by the processes
W ρt and W
σ
t in these equations. If these risks are diversifiable, then the risk neutral and the
statistically realized measures will be the same. Otherwise, the risk neutral and statistically
realized measures will differ by a risk premium. Referring to the risk associated with ρ, we
can represent the risk premium by a parameter λ (assumed constant, for simplicity)4, such
that to obtain the statistical measure, we should replace dW ρt in Equation (2.2) by dW
ρ
t +λdt.
This λ can be thought of as a Sharpe Ratio: it is the extra return required, per unit of extra
exposure to the risk represented by dW ρt . To see how the risk premium affects the return of
the firms equity, note first that under the risk neutral measure, the expected return will be
just the riskless return r. Ignoring the σ factor by assuming that σ = 0 in Equation (2.1),
which we do in most of our implementations, then the equity Jt is a smooth function of ρ,
and using the Ito formula, we can write dJt = (drift)dt+
∂
∂ρ
Jtdρ ≡ rdt+√ρtη ∂∂ρJtdW ρt . The
factor
√
ρtη
∂
∂ρ
Jt here is the equity volatility, and we will calculate this in the tables below.
Substituting dW ρt by dW
ρ
t + λdt, we can see that the risk premium increases the expected
return by λ times this volatility.
2.3 Solution
Under these assumptions, and ignoring for the moment the possibility of new equity issues,
the value of the firm’s equity is determined at any time t by the current values of ρ and C.
Denoting this value by Jqt (ρ, C), then we can write the HJB equation
Jqt (ρ, C) = max
dDt
{
dDt + e
−rdtE(ρ,C)t
[
Jqt+dt(ρt+dt, Ct+dt)
]}
, (2.4)
4Such λ has to exist, in the absence of arbitrage: see Duffie (2001).
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in which dt is an infinitesimally short time step and dDt is the optimal dividend payment
over this time step, which must be non-negative. Also, E
(ρ,C)
t means the expectation at time
t, given that (ρt, Ct) = (ρ, C). If the liquid reserve becomes low, then the firm can increase
it by issuing more equity, if this is feasible in terms of the share price. However, if the liquid
reserve becomes negative, then the firm is bankrupt.
Expanding Jqt+dt(ρt+dt, Ct+dt) in Equation (2.4), using the Ito Formula, E[dW
σ
t ] = 0, and
following standard manipulations we obtain the Ito Equation
Jqt (ρ, C)(1− e−rdt) = max
dDt≥0
{
dDt +
∂
∂t
Jqt + µ(ρ)
∂
∂ρ
Jqt +
1
2
ρη2
∂2
∂ρ2
Jqt
+ [(1− τ)(ρ− (f + q)) + rinC − dDt] ∂
∂C
Jqt +
1
2
σ2(1− τ)2 ∂
2
∂C2
Jqt
}
dt (2.5)
We emphasize that this equation holds only for the optimal choice of dDt, which depends
on (ρ, C).
The optimal choice of dDt here is singular: if
∂
∂C
Jqt < 1, then then it is optimal to pay
dividends as quickly as possible, reducing the cash holding until either ∂
∂C
Jqt ≥ 1, or C = 0,
where the firm becomes bankrupt. If ∂
∂C
Jqt > 1, then the firm will not pay dividends. If
∂
∂C
Jqt = 1, then the firm is indifferent between paying or not paying dividends.
The optimal decision can thus be characterized in terms a “save” region S and a “divi-
dend” region D in the state space {(ρ, C) : ρ > 0, C ≥ 0}. In S we have ∂
∂C
Jqt > 1, and also
Equation (2.5) holds, with dDt/dt = 0, i.e.
∂
∂t
Jqt − rJqt + µ(ρ)
∂
∂ρ
Jqt +
1
2
ρη2
∂2
∂ρ2
Jqt
+ [(1− τ)(ρ− (f + q)) + rinC] ∂
∂C
Jqt +
1
2
σ2
∂2
∂C2
Jqt = 0. (2.6)
In D we have
∂
∂C
Jqt = 1, (2.7)
and Equation (2.5) does not apply, since the value of an extra dollar in the liquidity reserve
is just its value if immediately paid as a dividend. If the liquid reserve Ct becomes too high,
so that (ρt, Ct)εD, then a dividend should immediately be paid, to take (ρt, Ct) back into
the region S , or to C = 0 and bankruptcy.
If the liquid reserve becomes low, then it may be optimal for the firm to issue new equity.
We have not included this possibility in the above formulation. In fact it is optimal to issue
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more equity if 5 ∂
∂C
Jqt >
1
θ
. This possibility leads to there being a third, ‘issue’ region, which
we will denote by I, lying below S, and in which
∂
∂C
Jqt =
1
θ
. (2.8)
If the liquid reserve Ct becomes low, so that (ρt, Ct)εI, then new equity should immediately
be issued, to take (ρt, Ct) back into the region S . Note that until bankruptcy occurs, the
process (ρt, Ct) will always remain in the save region S, since it is immediately pushed away,
whenever it enters the region D or I.
These regions must be chosen to maximize Jqt (ρ, C), which implies that there must be
smooth pasting of the solution across the boundaries. Also, these boundaries are ‘free’, in
that they are determined as part of the solution to Equations (2.6), (2,7), (2.8) with smooth
pasting.
The regions S, D and I are depicted in Figure 3, which also contains other information,
for a benchmark implementation, which we will describe in the following section. In this
figure, the region of pluses (“+”) is the dividend region D, the region of crosses (“x”) is the
issue region I, and the empty region is the save region S. The boundary above the save
region describes the target level of liquidity. Note that the region I is very thin, and covers
the region C = 0 for sufficiently large ρ. Also, the region S extends over high values of ρ,
but also becomes very thin. For such high ρ it is unnecessary to hold a liquidity reserve. It is
interesting that S is above D (i.e. it contains higher C values) over some low values of ρ. If
Ct declines over this region of ρ, such that the barrier between S and D is crossed, then the
firm pays its remaining liquidity holding as a dividend, and is abandoned to the creditors.
In bankruptcy the creditors are awarded the firm’s fixed assets net of bankruptcy costs
and they then operate them optimally as unlevered shareholders. We assume bankruptcy
costs are a proportion α of asset value, so that in bankruptcy, the bond holders receive6
5Proof: Suppose the current cash holding C is too low, and the firm raises δC in an equity issue, to
increase the cash holding. Suppose the firm initially has N shares, and issues n more shares. Denote by
s the share price after issue. Then the obtained from selling each new share is θs, and also n = δC/θs
and s = J(C + δC)/(N + n). These imply that s = [J(C + δC) − δC/θ]/N . Now, the firm will issue
shares if it increases the share price. Before issue, the share price is J(C)/N , and so the firm will issue if
J(C)/N < [J(C + δC)− δC/θ]/N , which implies that [J(C + δC)− J(C)]/δC > 1/θ. QED
6In our numerical implementation, we evolve the solutions Jqt , etc, backwards from a horizon t = T ,
which is sufficiently distant that the solution has achieved a steady state, i.e. it is independent of t, for t
near zero. Thus the value received on bankruptcy by the debt holders can be associated with J0t , for t = 0.
In fact ∂∂tJ
q
t = 0 in the steady state, and we could omit the t variable from our steady state equations.
However, keeping the t dependence is more appropriate for our solution method, described below, and for
the non-steady state calculations presented below, such as calculating the probability of bankruptcy after 20
years.
11
(1−α)J00 (ρ, 0), if the profitability at the time of bankruptcy is ρ. If we denote by B the first
(random, stopping) time s beyond t for which Cs = 0, given that (ρt, Ct) = (ρ, C), then the
value P qt (ρ, C) of debt can be written
P qt (ρ, C) = E
(ρ,C)
t
[
q
∫ s=B
s=t
e−rsds+ e−r(B−t)(1− α)J00 (ρB, CB)
]
. (2.9)
The debt value in equation (2.9) can be calculated by solving a PDE, in a similar way to
the equity value Jq(ρ, C) above. In fact, the calculation is simpler because the boundaries
of the region in which the debt is defined, i.e. S, have already been determined in the equity
valuation. The PDE for the debt, in the region S, is
q +
∂
∂t
P qt − rP qt + µ(ρ)
∂
∂ρ
P qt +
1
2
ρη2
∂
∂ρ2
P qt +
[(1− τ)(ρ− (f + q)) + rinC] ∂
∂C
P qt +
1
2
σ2
∂
∂C2
P qt = 0. (2.10)
The boundary conditions for the debt valuation are as follows: ∂
∂C
P qt = 0, where S meets
I or where S meets D and D is above S, corresponding to the reflection of the process Ct
at these boundaries; P qt = (1 − α)J00 (ρ, 0) where S meets D and D is below S, and in the
region of the axis C = 0, corresponding to the firm becoming bankrupt.
Our strategy for valuing the equity is to solve Equation (2.6) numerically, by finite differ-
ence procedures, evolving backwards from an horizon time T , at which we assume the firm
is abandoned and liquidated, so that JqT (ρ, C) = C. In particular, we take our scheme to be
implicit in the ρ direction, for the sake of numerical stability, and explicit in the C direction,
for ease of implementing the boundary conditions. See Ames (1992). We take T sufficiently
large, that the solution has effectively reached a steady state when time has evolved back to
t = 07. To determine the regions S, D and I, we test, at every time step and every grid point
point representing (ρ, C), whether it is optimal to pay dividends, issue shares, or abandon
the firm.
As well as the boundary conditions associated with the regions S, D and I, we must also
choose boundaries at high and low values of ρ and C, and we must impose corresponding
boundary conditions. We take the boundaries for low ρ and low C to be at zero; denote the
upper boundaries by ρmax and Cmax. At ρmax we have imposed the condition
∂
∂ρ
Jqt (ρ, C) = 0.
Now, this condition is not compatible with a linear choice µ(ρ) = κ(ρ¯− ρ) in Equation (2.2)
7It would be more usual to use the SOR technique to obtain our steady state solution, but our scheme is
more useful for studying how quickly the steady state is achieved, and for dealing with the non-steady state
problems, described below.
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above, and in fact it seems unclear what boundary condition would be compatible with this
choice of drift. Therefore we have taken µ(ρ) = −κρmax−ρmin
pi
tan( pi
ρmax−ρmin (ρ − ρ¯)), with
ρmin such that ρ¯ is midway between ρmin and ρmax. With this µ, the drift is infinite at ρmax,
forcing our boundary condition to be respected. Also, for the parameters chosen below,
this µ is very close to the linear function κ(ρ¯ − ρ) for normal values of ρ. The result of
our choice of µ here is that the profitability is forced very quickly away from unreasonably
high values, and the boundary condition is satisfied. In our numerical implementation, we
have also transformed the variable ρ to ξ := 1
2
ρ
1
2 . This is helpful because it leads to a finer
solution grid in the region for low ρ, which is the most interesting region (see the figures
below). Also the boundary condition for low ρ is automatically transformed to ∂
∂ξ
Jt = 0. At
C = Cmax we have imposed
∂
∂C
Jt(ρ, C) = 1, and at C = 0 we have imposed
∂
∂C
Jqt (ρ, C) = 1/θ
corresponding to “issue”, or Jqt = 0 , if “issue” would imply J
q
t < 0.
Our strategy for valuing the debt is to solve Equation (2.10) by similar finite difference
methods. At the horizon time T , we take the debt value to be min{q/r, (1 − α)J00 (ρ, 0)},
reflecting the assumption that if bankruptcy has not occurred by time T , the productive
asset is sold, incurring the bankruptcy costs, and the proceeds are used to pay pay of the
value of the debt valued as a risk free flow at rate q, if the proceeds are sufficient to do this8.
2.4 Implementation for a benchmark case
As discussed in the Introduction, one of our objectives was to develop a model which can
deliver quantitative predictions about liquid asset holding in a reasonably realistic setting.
While our model is simple enough to permit solution, we will show in this section that it
can be calibrated to match a number of empirical benchmarks. One of the advantages of
working with a structural contingent claims model of the firm is that we are able to look
at liquid asset holding in a model that also has implications for leverage, equity volatility
and quantitative measures typically used in credit market analysis, namely, credit spreads,
probability of default and loss-given-default (or equivalently, recovery rates).
We take our benchmark parameter set to be rin = 4%, r = 6%, ρ¯ = 0.15, η = 0.09, κ =
0.9, σ = 0.0, τ = 30%, θ = 0.8, q = 0.0045, f = 0.14 and α = 0.3 (all taken on an annual
basis). Also, we take λ = 0.3. Concerning the mathematical parameters, we represent
ξ ≡ 1
2
ρ
1
2 by a grid with 201 points, ranging from 0 to ρmax = 5, and we represent C by a grid
with 201 points ranging from 0 to Cmax = 0.5. Also, we take T = 50 years. Our solutions
are insensitive to first order variations of these mathematical parameters.
8Theoretically, the choice of terminal time T condition does not matter, if T is sufficiently far away. This
choice prevents arbitrage and ensures continuity at time T .
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Some of our parameters have a direct economic interpretation. Notice that by setting
rin = 0.04 we are assuming that one third of the market return on cash is dissipated by
keeping the cash inside the firm and under the control of management. We view this as a
reasonably severe problem of managerial moral hazard and a rather strong disincentive to
holding cash. In this sense, the levels of cash holding our model predicts might be viewed
as conservative. By setting θ = 0.8 we assume 20% of the market value of newly issued
equity is lost through transactions costs of one form or another. Given the direct costs
plus underpricing of equity issues, we view these costs as substantial but not unreasonable
in many settings. Similarly, our assumption of bankruptcy costs of 30% is consistent with
empirical evidence and the assumptions of other researchers. The sensitivity of our results
to these parameter choices is examined in the next section devoted to comparative statics.
A reasonable value for the risk premium (Sharpe Ratio) of the market itself in λ = 0.5,
corresponding to a market excess return of 8%, and market volatility to be 16%. On the
other hand a completely diversifiable risk would imply λ = 0. Thus, our choice λ = 0.3
is reasonable, if we assume that the risk of the firm has a systematic component, i.e. it is
somewhat correlated with the market.
The values of the technological parameters ρ¯, η, κ enable the process ρt to give a realistic
representation of a business cycle. This is evidenced by the simulation presented in Figure
2A. These values also give realistic equity volatility, leverage, credit spreads and default
probabilities. These implications of the model are derived according to the following method.
For each set of parameters we solve the model for the optimal regions ,D, I and S.
Then for each solution we perform 300 simulations as in Figure 2, each one starting from
ρ = 0.2, C = 0.0 and running to the firm’s bankruptcy. We then calculate the overall
average liquidity until bankruptcy. Based on the realizations of the simulations we also
calculate non-parametrically the average liquidity as a function of expected revenue flow,
denoted C(ρ). Using this average liquidity function, we study the model conditional on 4
levels of profitability - ρ = 0.10 (‘low’), ρ = 0.15 (‘normal’), ρ = 0.20 (‘high’), and ρ = 0.25
(‘very high’). At each level of ρ and average liquidity C(ρ), we present the net equity9 value
Jq(ρ, C(ρ)) − C(ρ) (i.e. equity, net of the liquid reserve), debt value Dq(ρ, C(ρ)), net firm
value Jq(ρ, C(ρ)) + Dq(ρ, C(ρ)) − C(ρ) , leverage (debt value divided by the value of the
firm), and the yield spread (yield on debt less r). Finally, we give the equity volatility,
calculated as
√(√
ρη ∂
∂ρ
J
)2
+
(
σ ∂
∂C
J
)2
/J .
In addition we calculate the yield spread on zero-coupon bonds of 5 and 20 years until
9Taking net equity and firm values is appropriate when we compare valuations across different scenarios.
To change between scenarios with different liquidity reserves, one would have to make up the difference with
cash.
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maturity. For this calculation, and following Duffie and Lando (2001), we assume that the
perpetual debt is made up of a continuum of zero coupon bonds, and if the firm defaults,
the these bonds are paid off in proportion to their value weight in the total debt. This
calculation is done by adapting the perpetual debt valuation to accommodate this default
rule, a payment of one dollar if there is not default before maturity, and the coupon being
zero. We also calculate the probability of of bankruptcy at 1, 5 and 20 year horizons. This
calculation is again done by adapting the perpetual bond valuation, and we include the risk
premium λ, since this probability is not risk neutral, but objectively realized.
By this methodology we have calculated the values of liquidity, debt value, equity, and
leverage as in Table 1a and the credit relevant statistics as in Table 1b. We take as the main
reference for our calibration the case q = 0.0045 and ρ = 0.2 which corresponds to quite
good business conditions. From Table 1a, we see that with the other benchmark parameters
as given, and with ρ = 0.2, this value of q maximizes the value of the firm. Also from Table
1a, we see that with these parameters, our model generates a leverage of 40% and an equity
volatility of 30%. For this firm, the average liquid asset holding is something over 7% of
total asset value. From Table 1b, we see that this firm has a credit spread of 70 basis points
over the risk free rate. Under our assumption about the risk premium, the probability of
default at the five-year horizon is 1.7%. This is corresponds to Standard and Poor’s historical
experience for a bond rated BBB or perhaps a bit below (see, de Servigny and Renault).
Our results on leverage and equity volatility are realistic for a firm in that rating class. Our
results for credit spreads may seem a bit low for this rating class, but we need to recognize
that our model does not include any allowance for a liquidity component in yield spreads. A
number of analysts suggest that liquidity may account for a large fraction of observed yield
spreads and can easily amount to 100 basis points for many instruments10. Accepting this,
we arrive at a total yield spread of 170 basis points which is very plausible for bonds rated
at the bottom of the investment grade. When we discuss Figure 4, we will see in addition
that the model generates very plausible figures for loss-given-default as well.
Figure 1, Panels A and B, graph the equity and debt values as functions of ρ and C, over
the region S. As we have explained, the process (ρt, Ct) will never stray from this region. In
the Figure the ρ axis ranges from 0.0 to 0.5, and C varies from 0.00 to 0.07. As expected,
the equity value increases with ρ and C, as also does the debt value, but less steeply, and
with less upside for high ρ and C.
10In their calibration of several contingent claims models Huang and Huang report an average yield spread
of 194 basis points for 10-year bonds rated BBB. In their benchmark calibration they find the credit com-
ponent accounts for 56 basis points leaving 138 basis points accounted for by liquidity and possibly other
factors.
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Figure 2, Panel A graphs a time series simulation of the profitability ρt, and Panel B
graphs the corresponding optimal cash holding Ct, the equity value Jt and the total firm
value Jt + Dt. This simulation starts from ρ0 = 0.2 at t = 0, and continues until the firm
becomes bankrupt, and we have started the figure at t = 110 years.
This figure nicely illustrates some of the properties of the optimal policy for the firm.
Starting at about period 118 and lasting until period 125 the firm suffers a sharp drop in
profitability. This results in a reduction of cash reserves so that by period 121 the firm has
zero cash. Between period 121 and 124 the firm issues equity to survive. It does so because
by then profitability had recovered somewhat. After period 124 profitability has improved
sufficiently for the firm to stop issuing equity and to start to build up its cash reserve. Later,
from period 129, the firm once again suffers a drop in profitability. This time the business
conditions are so severe that when the firm exhausts its cash, no equity is issued and the
firm declares bankruptcy.
Figure 3 gives the regions ,D, I and S (‘dividend’, ‘issue’, and ‘save’), indicated respec-
tively by pluses (“+”), crosses (“x”), and empty space. It also gives as a line of stars, the
average realized liquidity holdings as a function of ρ, resulting from 300 simulations of the
benchmark case. For low values of ρ, the average cash holding is less than the target repre-
sented by the upper boundary of S, though it is still a substantial fraction of the firm value,
at reasonable levels of ρ.
We also see in Figure 3, that the region S bulges to the left, above the value ρ around
0.08. At such values of ρ, and for C around 0.05, then (ρ, C)²S, and the firm will use the
liquidity represented by C to pay operating losses, in the hope of surviving until business
conditions improve. But at such ρ and for C around say 0.01, then in our model, this cash
will be paid out, and the firm will be abandoned. As we have mentioned above, whether
the shareholders are allowed to do this, or whether they could be effectively prevented, is a
pertinent question.
Figure 4 gives the equity valuations in terms of ρ, at C = 0 for our benchmark case
(pluses), and for the corresponding unlevered case (crosses). It also gives the debt value in
terms of ρ, and for all values of C (stars). The lowest of these stars gives the debt values at
C = 0. We see from Figure 3 that the benchmark firm will go bankrupt for ρ in the region
from 0.07 to 0.09, depending on the trajectory of the liquidity reserve. For higher ρ the
crosses indicate that the firm will issue equity if C = 0, and the region S does not extend to
lower ρ. We see from Figure 4, that the debt value is quite insensitive to the profitability ρ,
when ρ is relatively high, and has value about 0.070, but when the firm goes bankrupt, the
debt value is about 0.035. Assuming that the firm was initiated when the profitability was
high, we thus see that the debts recovery rate on bankruptcy is about 0.035
0.070
≈ 50%. This
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number is consistent with empirical studies of BBB rated firms. Over the period 1988-2002
Standard and Poors found that the recovery rates on defaulted bonds were 30 per cent for
Senior Subordinated Notes, 38 per cent for Senior Unsecured Notes, and 50 per cent for
Senior Secured Notes. (See de Servigny and Renault (2004) Chapter 4.)
3 Some Comparative Statics
In this section we explore the sensitivity of the model to the most significant economic
parameters.
3.1 Leverage, q:
Table 1 summarizes our results for the parameter values of the benchmark case above, except
for q, which ranges over the values 0.0000, 0.0005, ..., 0.0060. Our benchmark parameter set
includes q = 0.0045, and we see from Panel A, that for ρ = 0.2 (‘high’), the firm value is
at the maximum at this value of q. The firm chooses its leverage when it is initiated, and
it should rationally choose q to maximize its value. Assuming that the firm is initiated in
a favorable business climate (high ρ), then it should choose this value of q, and this is why
we have included this in our benchmark parameter set. As already discussed this value of q
also gives realistic credit spreads and default probabilities for a BBB rated firm.
The average values of the liquidity reserve are non-monotonic in q, and amounts to
about 15% of the firm value, for normal ρ. This figure is in line with the empirical evidence
presented by Opler et al (1999).
3.2 Volatilities η and σ:
The parameters η and σ represent different sources of volatility in our model: η refers to the
dynamic of the profitability ρ. Given the mean reverting nature of the profitability relation, η
shocks are persistent. In contrast, σ refers to a white noise type of volatility which represents
a non-persistent shock to profitability.
In Table 2, Columns 2 and 3, we examine the effect of varying the level of the persistent
volatility while the other parameters are at their benchmark levels. These columns should be
compared with each other, and with Column 1, which repeats the results for the benchmark
case. We see that liquid cash holdings conditional on this level of profitability is strongly
increasing in η. Also, as η increases, the probability of bankruptcy increases, and the net
firm value decreases, as expected, since bankruptcy is costly. However, most of this reduction
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in net firm value comes at the expense of debt, which decreases much more than the equity
value. This is consistent with the asset substitution effect: higher volatility means a higher
upside potential, which mostly accrues to equity, and higher downside risk, which most
accrues to the debt. This effect is superposed on the effect of the increased probability of
bankruptcy, which reduces the value of debt and equity, and the cost of the higher liquidity
reserve, which reduces the value of equity11.
The effects of changes in nonpersistent volatility, σ, are seen in columns 4 and 5 of Table
2. We see that increasing σ again causes the firm to hold a higher liquid reserve. This is
true even for ρ = 0.25 (‘very high’), and in fact for σ > 0 there is no upper limit of ρ above
which no liquid reserve is held12. We also see that with σ > 0, the probability of bankruptcy
is higher, and the firm value is lower. However, in contrast to increasing persistent volatility
η, the loss in firm value is distributed more evenly between debt and equity. Since σ has no
dynamic implication on the profitability ρ of the firm, there is no asset substitution effect
associated with this parameter.
The results for varying σ are consistent with those of Mello and Parsons (2000), and
Rochet and Villeneuve (2004), if we assume that the shock σdW σt to the earnings cash flow
can be hedged. This may be the case for a firm heavily dependent upon inputs of commodities
traded in futures markets which typically are liquid only for relatively short time horizons.
If so, then hedging corresponds to setting σ = 0. Note that σdW σt is a martingale difference,
corresponding to the assumption that there is no risk premium associated with this risk.
The modelling set up is different in these papers, but the results are consistent with ours, in
finding that hedging decreases the optimal liquidity reserve, and increases the firm value13.
These results for η and σ are also consistent with the empirical findings of Opler et al,
who document that higher volatility is associated with a higher liquidity reserve.
3.3 Speed of mean reversion κ:
The effects of changes in the mean parameter κ are given in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 2. As
this parameter is higher, the debt value, the credit spreads and the probability of bankruptcy
11If the bankruptcy cost is is taken to be lower, at 5%, and the tax rate is set at 0, to obviate tax shield
effects, then higher volatility η increases the equity value, and decreases the debt value, consistent with the
usual asset substitution effect. To conserve space, this is not shown.
12This is not shown. This can presumably be explained in terms of the infinite variational nature of the
earnings cash flow for σ > 0, under which the realized earning cash flow can be negative over a very short
time, even if ρ is very high.
13One might also be able to hedge the risk associated with ρ, but this would not be modelled by simply
taking η = 0, but rather by subtracting the martingale component of the process ρ.
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are all lower. Also, the firm value is higher, but this benefit falls to the debt, and not the
equity, which is slightly lower. In fact higher κ has much the same effect as lower η. This
is intuitively reasonable, since increasing the mean reversion and decreasing the volatility in
equation (2.2) both make the process ρt less likely to stray far from the mean.
3.4 Bankruptcy costs α:
In Columns 8 and 9 of Table 2, we study the effect of changing bankruptcy costs in our model.
The question of the level of bankruptcy costs has been much discussed in the literature. Early
estimates based on US railroad bankruptcies suggests direct bankruptcy costs for firms with
predominantly fixed assets may be relatively low (see Warner (1977)). For example as a
proportion of the firm value, 5 per cent might be reasonable. More recent research based on
formal reorganizations (Chapter 11) as well as liquidations (Chapter 7) and working with a
wider range of industries (including those with substantial intangible assets) suggests that
total bankruptcy costs (including both direct and indirect costs) may be very substantial.
(See Franks and Torous (1989) and Weiss (1990)). This has led some debt analysts to assume
bankruptcy costs as high as 50 per cent of the firm’s assets (e.g., Leland (1994)). In light of
this we have taken α = 0.3 as our benchmark, and in Table 2 we have evaluated our model
for values α = 0.05 and α = 0.50.
The first thing to note from Columns 8 and 9 of Table 2, is that changes in bankruptcy
costs have no affect whatsoever on the equity value, and the holding of liquid assets. This
is a direct reflection of the fact that bankruptcy costs accrue completely to debt holders,
because in our model we assume bankruptcy respects absolute priority of financial claims.
As a result bankruptcy costs do not affect the shareholders’ choice of liquid asset holding,
once the choice of capital structure, represented by the payment rate q to debt, has been
fixed. This in turn implies that the value of equity is unaffected by changes in bankruptcy
costs.
Changes in bankruptcy costs also have no effect on the probability of bankruptcy, in
Columns 8 and 9 of Table 2, panel B. Consequently, the effect of higher bankruptcy costs is
simply to reduce the value of creditor’s collateral, and thus the debt value and firm value14.
Our assumption that in bankruptcy absolute priority of claims is maintained contrasts
with the literature on strategic debt service (e.g., Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-
14However, higher bankruptcy costs will reduce the value of the debt, and will lead the firm to choose a
lower q to maximize the firm value, and a higher liquidity reserve. (To conserve space, this is not shown.)
This is consistent with the empirical finding of Kim et al (1998) who find weak evidence of a positive
association between bankruptcy costs and liquidity holdings.
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Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Acharya et.al. (2002)). From this literature, it seems likely
that allowing for deviations from absolute priority in our setting would make equity value
sensitive to bankruptcy costs. Not only would this directly affect the values received by
shareholders in the event of bankruptcy, but it would also likely affect the cash management
policy which indirectly would affect the probability of bankruptcy.
3.5 Efficiency of external finance θ:
In our model the efficiency of external capital markets is captured by the parameter θ which
is the fraction of the value of securities issued by the firm which accrues to the firm. The
fraction 1 − θ is lost through the underwriting process as commissions, fees or excessive
dilution.
In Column 10 of Table 2, we consider the extreme case of θ = 0.01, which may be taken
as the case when capital markets are so inefficient as to be virtually useless. In Column 11
we take the opposite extreme of θ = 0.95 which would seem to correspond to a very efficient
capital market and small agency costs. While θ cannot be directly interpreted as the degree
of underpricing, the estimates of the underpricing of IPO’s, range from 5 per cent to often
greater than 20 per cent. In the U.S. seasoned issues typically involve somewhat lower costs.
From the estimates of Lee et.al. (1996) using the U.S. data, reasonable estimates might be
11% for IPO’s and 7% for seasoned issues. This suggests that θ = 0.95 would be appropriate
only for very highly developed capital markets, and where there is no information asymmetry.
Our benchmark value is θ = 0.8.
From Columns 10 and 11 of Table 2 we see that when capital market efficiency increases,
the average level of liquid asset holding decreases. Focusing on the average profit case ρ =
0.15, liquid assets average about 50 per cent of the net firm value in the very underdeveloped
capital market context. In the 95 per cent efficient capital market, optimal liquid assets
correspond to only about 3 per cent of firm value. This result is consistent with that of Opler
et al (1999), who document empirically that firms with greater access to capital markets carry
smaller amounts of liquidity reserve. This result is also consistent with the findings of Ditmar
et.al. who study an international comparison of large firms and find a negative association
between cash holdings and an index of investor protections. A similar result is obtained in
study of listed firms in twelve continental European countries by Ferreira and Vilela (2002)
who find a negative association between liquidity and capital market development, proxied by
the ratio of the country’s free float (i.e., total value of stocks held by minority shareholders)
to GDP.
Continuing the analysis of the normal profit case we see that the value of the firm is
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increasing in θ which is as we would expect. Interestingly, most of the benefits of this
increased capital market efficiency accrues to debt holders. That is, when equity issuance is
more efficient, shareholders are slower to abandon the firm, so that creditors stand a better
chance of being paid. This is reflected in the credit spreads and bankruptcy probabilities
being much lower in the efficient capital market case.
Finally, it is interesting that a more efficient capital market is associated with higher
levels of equity volatility. An intuitive explanation for this is that the higher liquidity as-
sociated with market inefficiency serves to dampen the equity volatility. This intuition will
be supported in Subsection 4.2 below, where we will see that the equity volatility is much
higher, when the firm is not allowed to hold a liquidity reserve.
3.6 Internal cost of financial slack r − rin:
In our framework the cost of holding liquidity inside the firm is represented by the r − rin.
This is a proxy for the amount of rent extraction that is obtained through various forms
of managerial moral hazard. In Columns 12 and 13 of Table 2 we take rin = 3% and 5%
while we maintain our other benchmark parameters including r = 6%. In our view rin = 3%
would indicate severe agency problems since in this case half the income flow from liquid
assets would be diverted or wasted by managers.
First we note that the average level of liquid asset holding is strongly increasing in
rin. This is reasonable, since a reduction in the costs of holding liquid assets should lead
shareholders to hold greater amounts of such assets. Focusing on the normal profit case
(ρ = 0.15) we see that the value of the firm is strongly increasing in rin as we would expect.
At rin = 0.05 when insiders extract only 1/6 of the return on liquid assets, the optimal level
of liquid asset holding is about 25 per cent of net firm value.
The values of both equity and debt are increasing in rin. The benefit to shareholders is
direct since as residual claims on the firm’s cash flows any increase in the return on a given
level of liquid securities accrues to them. The benefit to creditors is indirect through the
fact that the higher level of cash holding by the firm reduces the chances of bankruptcy.
The sharing of the benefits of higher rin is fairly evenly spread across debt and equity. As
with varying θ, the higher level of liquid asset holding here is associated with a lower level
of equity volatility.
21
4 Agency Conflicts, Debt Covenants and the Liquidity
Reserve
In our model, the liquidity reserve is chosen by the shareholders to maximize the share
price. This choice is made simultaneously with the default strategy, and the debt holders are
assumed to have no influence in these choices. It is thus possible that the liquidity reserve
strategy of the shareholders is detrimental to the debt holders, or to the economic efficiency
of the firm.
In this section we will address a number of issues arising from this debt-equity conflict.
First we ask what the consequences would be for the debt, equity and firm values, if the
managers were maximizing the firm value, rather than the equity value. The answer to this
tells us the severity of the conflict in terms of how much the equity holders are gaining from
the bond holders via their liquidity strategy. Also, since the debt holders can anticipate
this gain when they originally buy the bonds, the consequences for the firm value are the
appropriate measure of the economic cost of the liquidity strategy. Our answer will be that,
at our benchmark parameters, the managers would maintain a higher, not a lower liquidity
reserve, if they were maximizing the firm value. This can be explained by noting that the
liquidity reserve is protecting against bankruptcy, as well as protecting the productive asset,
and bankruptcy costs fall on the bond holders. Also in our model, the tax shield is lost on
bankruptcy. We also see that this higher liquidity greatly benefits the debt value and the
firm value, with relatively little erosion of the equity value. To gain more insight, we also
investigate the case when the bankruptcy cost α is lower, at 5%, and τ = 0, so that there is
no tax shield to protect. In this last case, maximizing the firm value, rather than the equity
value has a relatively small effect the firm value, and mostly has the effect of transferring
value from the equity holder to the debt holders.
Second, we ask what would be the consequences if firm were prohibited from holding
a liquidity reserve. Under such a prohibition, the equity holders must lose, since they are
forced to declare bankruptcy suboptimally. But it is unclear whether the debt holders will
lose or gain: they will tend to gain from the suboptimal bankruptcy, but they will tend to
lose from the more imminent bankruptcy costs. At our benchmark parameters, the debt
holders lose slightly under this prohibition, but with τ = 0, α = 5%, they gain slightly,
though greatly at the expense of the equity and the firm value.
Third, we analyze two debt covenants, and discuss these in relation to the possibility
that the firm will make a discrete liquidating dividend at bankruptcy. The first covenant
requires the firm to keep a minimum liquidity reserve, which the debt holders can claim on
bankruptcy. The second covenant prohibits the firm from paying a dividend when it is not
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profitable. Both of these enhance the debt value at the expense of the equity value. But the
first usually erodes the firm value, and so it is of no economic value; and it does not obviate
the possibility of the discrete liquidating dividend. By contrast, the second enhances the
firm value, and does obviate the possibility of the discrete liquidating dividend, and so it is
to be preferred.
Finally, we make some more remarks on the discrete liquidating dividend, and show
that it is not the cash flow associated with this dividend which is significantly detrimental
to the bond holders, but the fact that in making it, the shareholders trigger bankruptcy
prematurely.
4.1 Taking the liquidity Reserve to Maximize the Firm value:
The levered firm value is the discounted expectation of dividends and payments to debt, up
to bankruptcy, at which time its value is 1 − α times its unlevered value. Following our
discussion in Section 2.3, if the firm value is being maximized, then its value F qt (ρ, C) will
satisfy
q +
∂
∂t
F qt − rF qt + µ(ρ)
∂
∂ρ
F qt +
1
2
ρη2
∂2
∂ρ2
F qt
+ [(1− τ)(ρ− (f + q)) + rinC] ∂
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F qt +
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2
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∂2
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in the ‘save’ region SF ;
∂
∂C
F qt = 1, (4.2)
in the ‘dividend’ region DF ; and
∂
∂C
F qt =
1
θ
. (4.3)
in the ‘issue’ region IF . Consistent with the boundary conditions in Section 2.3, if the firm
become bankrupt, then it has value (1− α)J00 (ρ, 0), and at the horizon time T , we take the
value to be C +min{q/r, (1− α)J00 (ρ, 0)}.
The numerical procedure described in Subsection 2.3 is easily adapted to this case, and
the result is summarized in Table 3. In this table, the first two columns correspond to our
benchmark case; the first column repeats the relevant numbers from Table 1, except that we
also present results for ρ = 0.05(‘very low’). The second column corresponds to maximizing
the firm value. In this column, we calculate the firm value as just described, and then the
debt value as in Section 2.3, based on the regions SF ,DF and IF , and the share value is
then the firm value minus the debt value. We see, as expected, that the net firm value (i.e.
net of the value of the liquidity reserve) is higher, the debt value his higher, and the net
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equity value is lower in the second column, than in the first. In fact the gain to debt is much
higher than the loss to equity. Also, the liquidity level is higher. In fact when maximizing
the firm value, and for very low ρ, the equity value is negative, but the firm still operates,
whereas the equity maximizing firm has already gone bankrupt.
The results corresponding to Table 1 Panel B, i.e. the credit spreads and bankruptcy
probabilities, and all zero for maximizing the firm value, in the 4 cases discussed in this
subsection, and so these are not displayed. These indicate that the firm never goes bankrupt
when the firm value is being maximized.
Columns 3 and 4 repeat the case of columns 1 and 2, but with bankruptcy cost at 5%,
rather than 30%. Column 3 here is a repeat of Column 8 of Table 2, and comparing Columns
1 and 3, the equity value and liquidity holdings are the same, but the debt value is higher,
as discussed in Subsection 3.4. Comparing Columns 3 and 4, the result is much the same as
the comparison between Columns 1 and 2, except that the gain to debt in Column 4 is not
so much, since the avoidance of the bankruptcy cost is not so crucial.
Columns 5 and 6 again repeat the case of columns 1 and 2, but with τ = 0, so that there
is no tax shield. Comparing these again gives much the same result as comparing columns
1 and 2.
Columns 7 and 8 present the case α = 0.05 and τ = 0. Comparing Column 7 with
Column 1, the equity and debt values are both higher, as expected. Also, the liquidity
reserve is higher. Comparing Columns 7 with 8, the firm value and liquidity reserve are very
little different, and we see that the differences in debt and equity values are substantially
more than the change in the net firm value.
To summarize this subsection: Maximizing the firm value, rather than the equity value,
is particularly valuable to debt holders, and to the firm value itself, when bankruptcy costs
and the tax shield are significant. In this case, the agency conflict results in a significant
erosion of economic value. But when bankruptcy costs and the tax shield are not high, the
agency conflict is associated with a transfer of value between the equity and debt holders,
more than a destruction of economic value15.
15This result is in tune with the findings of Titman, Tompaidis and Tayplakov (2004), who study the
debt and equity values of a levered firm, and compare these values under an equity-optimizing investment
strategy, with the values if the investment strategy were constrained to be as if the firm were unlevered. They
show that the equity-optimal strategy transfers value from debt to equity, but does not destroy much value.
These authors have in mind real estate project financing, and ‘investment’ in their context corresponds to
maintenance of the real estate. They take the bankruptcy cost to be zero in their benchmark case, and they
do not have a tax shield effect in their model, corresponding to our condition τ = 0.
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4.2 What if the Liquidity Reserve is Prohibited?:
In this case, the equation for the equity value reduces to
∂
∂t
Jqt − rJqt +
dDt
dt
+ µ(ρ)
∂
∂ρ
Jqt +
1
2
ρη2
∂2
∂ρ2
Jqt +Θ(ρ− (f + q)) = 0, (4.4)
in the region ρ > Bt in which J
q
t (ρ) > 0, and J
q
t (ρ) = 0 in the region ρ ≤ Bt, where Bt is the
profitability level below which the firm declares bankrupt. Also, we take Θ(d) = (1− τ)d for
d > 0 corresponding to paying dividends, and Θ(d) = ((1− τ)/θ)d for d < 0, corresponding
to issuing equity to cover cash shortfalls. The factor (1 − τ) here reflects that tax is paid
on operating income net of interest payments and fixed costs and tax loss write-backs are
allowed. The solution is developed backwards in time t from Jqt (ρ) = 0 at a horizon time
t = T , and the barrier Bt is chosen to maximize the value of J
q
t (ρ) at each t and ρ.
The equation for the debt reduces to
q +
∂
∂t
P qt − rP qt + µ(ρ)
∂
∂ρ
P qt +
1
2
ρη2
∂
∂ρ2
P qt = 0, (4.5)
in the region ρt > Bt and P
q
t (ρ) = (1 − τ)J0(ρ) in the region ρt < Bt. These reduced
equations are been solved in a similar way to the full equations.
In comparing the case when liquidity holdings are allowed, and when they are prohibited,
we calculate the bankrupt value in both cases assuming that the debt holders can efficiently
cover any cash shortfalls, if they take over the firm, i.e. that they have ‘deep pockets’. With
deep pockets, the bond holders do not need a liquidity reserve, and the bankrupt valuation
is is achieved by solving Equation (4.4), with θ = 1 . Our purpose in doing this is to ensure
that the bankrupt firm value is the same, whether or not the share holders are allowed to
hold liquidity.
The results are given in Table 4. The first column repeats the benchmark case of Table
1, Column 6, or Table 2, Column 1, except that the debt is more valuable, since the debt
holders having ‘deep pockets’ leads to the firm being more valuable in bankruptcy. The
second column uses the same parameters, but with liquidity reserve prohibited. We see that
the prohibition substantially reduces the values of both equity and debt. In Columns 3
and 4 the bankruptcy cost is reduced to 5%, and as expected, this change leaves the equity
value is unchanged, but the debt value is increased. The prohibition still reduces the equity
value substantially, but reduces the debt value much less. Columns 5 and 6 correspond to
τ = 0, α = 30%. Decreasing τ has made the equity more valuable, but the effect of the
prohibition is again to reduce the equity value substantially, and to leave the debt value
virtually unchanged. Columns 7 and 8 correspond to τ = 0, α = 5%, and now we see that
the liquidity prohibition reduces the equity value but slightly increases the debt value.
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To summarize: Equity holders will always lose from a debt covenant prohibiting a liquid-
ity holding, since they will be forced to declare bankrupt suboptimally, losing the productive
asset and the tax shield, if τ > 0. The bondholders tend to gain from the suboptimal
bankruptcy, but lose from the more imminent bankruptcy costs, under such a covenant, and
if these costs are low, the net effect might be a slight gain. However, the firm value is always
lower under such a prohibition16.
The debt values in Table 4 are surprisingly high, and the credit spreads correspondingly
low, and in fact negative in Columns 7 and 8. This is because the firm is more valuable to
the debt holders than to the equity holders, even if the equity holders are unlevered, since
the debt holders have ‘deep pockets’ (θ = 1), and can finance any cash shortfalls efficiently.
It seems unlikely that the debt would actually carry a negative credit spread, and more likely
that there would be a departure from absolute default priority rules, in this case. However,
these calculations serve to demonstrate that the debt can sometimes gain from a liquidity
prohibition.
4.3 Two Debt Covenants:
To address agency conflicts analyzed above, it is natural for the debt holders to impose
covenants on the liquidity that the firm can hold, or relating to the possible discrete liq-
uidating dividend. We have seen in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 that allowing the firm to hold a
liquidity reserve usually benefits debt holders as well as equity holders. Therefore a covenant
prohibiting the liquidity reserve would usually be of no value. A more promising covenant
might therefore be to require that the liquidity reserve be maintained at not less than a min-
imum level say C, which the debt holders can claim in bankruptcy. This covenant can easily
be incorporated into our dynamic programme by altering the boundary conditions, so that
the firm becomes bankrupt at C = C, and the debt value on bankruptcy is (1−α)J00 (ρ, 0)+C,
in which ρ is the profitability at bankruptcy.
The results are given in Table 5. In this table, Column 1 repeats the benchmark case
of Section 2.4, and Columns 2 and 3 implement the covenant, respectively with C = 0.005
and C = 0.010. We see that the effect of the covenant is that the firm holds extra liquidity,
only slightly less than the amount reserved for the bond holders, and the net equity value
(i.e. net of all liquidity) is eroded. This erosion can be explained since this extra liquidity is
imputed to earn interest at the inefficient rate rin. In fact, apart form being an extra burden,
16This result is again in tune with the analysis of Titman, Tompaidis and Tayplakov (2004), concerning
the effects of debt covenants that prohibit the injection of extra cash unless the project value is less than
the debt value. These cause the equity value to be lower, but the debt value can be higher.
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this bond holder reserved liquidity does not have a significant dynamic effect on the liquidity
reserve, and in particular, it does not postpone bankruptcy. Also, the prospect of the discrete
liquidating dividend is largely unaltered. The debt value is higher, since the debt holders can
expect a higher payoff in bankruptcy, but the firm value is usually eroded, reflecting simply
that the firm is carrying an extra liquidity amount C, which earns an inefficient return.
We next analyze a covenant which prohibits the firm from paying a dividend when it
is not currently sufficiently profitable. Leuz, Deller and Stubenrath (1998) note that debt
covenants restricting dividend payouts when the firm is in distress are common in the US,
but not in the UK. They argue that such covenants are considered unnecessary in the UK
because company law already restricts the conditions under which firms can pay dividends,
largely based on recent earnings.
In detail, we consider a covenant which prohibits dividend payments when when ρt <
f+q−L, where L represents a measure of lee-way allowed under the covenant. This covenant
will automatically obviate the possibility of the discrete liquidating dividend, at least if L is
not chosen to be so big that the firm is allowed to pay dividends when it is not worthwhile
to continue operating. This covenant can be incorporated into our dynamic programme, by
imposing Equation (2.6) above for all (ρ, C) such that ρ < f + q−L, irrespective of whether
∂
∂C
Jqt > 1.
The results are given in Table 5, Columns 4, 5, 6 corresponding respectively to L =
0.00, 0.02, 0.04. Comparing these columns with Column 1, which corresponds to there being
no covenant, we see that the covenant enhances the debt and firm values significantly, and
much more than it erodes the equity value.
The enhancement of the debt at the expense of the equity might be attributed at least
partially to the direct value of the prospective liquidation dividend, which the covenant has
saved for the debt holders at the expense of the equity holders. However, the value of the
liquidating dividend is very small, when the firm is not currently in distress. This contingent
cash flow can be valued by simulating its discounted risk neutral expectation, and if currently
ρ = 0.2, then its value is about 0.0000817. This is less than the wealth transfer between debt
and equity, associated with the covenant.
Preventing the transfer associated with the liquidating dividend cannot in any case ac-
count for the enhancement of the firm value, and this must be attributed to the fact that
the covenant makes bankruptcy less imminent, since the firm will continue operating at any
ρ value, if there is some liquidity reserve. In fact we see from the table that the firm might
17Simulation also shows that the a liquidating dividend will be paid in about one quarter of bankruptcies,
and if it is paid, then its average value will be about 0.01. The value at ρ = 0.2 is so low because at such ρ
bankruptcy is not expected for decades.
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continue operating at ρ = 0.05, when the net equity value is negative.
It is interesting that the average amount of the liquidity reserve is not much affected by
this covenant, and the lee-way value L does not have much effect on the valuations. Overall,
our results are consistent with the view that covenants imposing a profitability condition for
dividends are value increasing.
5 Summary and Conclusions
We have developed a structural dynamic model of a company’s optimal holding of liquid
reserve, together with its optimal debt and equity issuance and dividend policy. Our model
allows for a stochastic mean reverting earnings rate, and we it solve numerically, as a non-
linear PDE with free boundaries, with the expected earnings and cash levels as the state
variables.
We have shown with this model that it is in shareholders’ interests to hold relatively
large amounts of cash inside the firm the even if they have access to relatively efficient
capital markets and even if some of the return cash is dissipated by insiders. The reason
that forcing the firm to pay out “idle” cash in relatively good times may be a bad idea, is
that it is myopic– it does not properly weight the future dilution costs to shareholders of
raising funds, if the firm later were to approach financial distress.
While the interests of shareholders and creditors regarding cash holding policy are not
perfectly aligned, they are not totally divergent either. Our comparison of a share-value-
maximizing policy with a firm-value-maximizing policy reveals that the targeted levels of
cash are often quite similar under both policies. The one area where their interests clearly
diverge is when the firm’s earnings are persistently low. In such circumstances, it is optimal
for shareholders to pay out available cash in the form of special dividend, thus exposing the
firm to financial distress. In this regard we have shown that it may enhance firm value to
prevent the firm from paying dividends when earnings are low, as is often done through bond
covenants or as seen in some systems of corporate law.
In order to assure the relevance of our solutions we have been careful in calibrating
our model. For plausible parameter values, our model is able to simultaneously hit many
empirical benchmarks including: firm leverage, liquidity holdings, credit spreads, default
probabilities at various time horizons, debt recovery rates given default, and equity volatility.
Our model also exhibits realistic comparative statics behavior. For example, it has been
documented that liquidity holdings increases when external finance becomes more costly,
and our model reflects this.
Our model also gives some new insights: First, we corroborate the recent conclusion of
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Mello and Parsons (2000) and Rochet and Villeneuve (2004), that hedging can enhance firm
value, by decreasing the optimal liquidity reserve. Regarding the asset substitution effect,
whereby increasing earnings volatility tends to benefit equity at the expense of debt, we
see that this effect only occurs if the extra volatility affects the earnings state variable in a
dynamic way, and will not occur if the earnings cash flow is merely subjected to a random
perturbation. Finally, the liquidity reserve has the effect of dampening the equity price
volatility. Thus, if the market is more efficient in terms of external finance being less costly,
then the equity volatility will be higher, since the liquidity holding will be lower.
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TABLE 3
Maximizing Equity versus Maximizing the Firm Value
Tax rate τ 30% 30% 0% 0%
Bankruptcy cost α 30% 5% 30% 5%
Value being maximized Equity Firm Equity Firm Equity Firm Equity Firm
Measures at ρ = 0.05
Liquidity N/A 0.0000 N/A 0.0000 N/A 0.0000 N/A 0.0000
Net equity val 0.0000 -0.0403 0.0000 -0.0397 0.0000 -0.0555 0.0000 -0.0542
Debt val 0.0104 0.0747 0.0134 0.0750 0.0154 0.0750 0.0198 0.0750
Net firm val 0.0104 0.0343 0.0134 0.0353 0.0154 0.0195 0.0198 0.0207
Leverage 0.4047 2.1728 0.4663 2.1260 0.4343 3.8418 0.4966 3.6089
Perp. cr. spread 0.369 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.230 0.000 0.166 0.000
Measures at ρ = 0.10
Liquidity 0.0077 0.0086 0.0077 0.0090 0.0103 0.0114 0.0103 0.0114
Net equity val 0.0104 0.0052 0.0104 0.0059 0.0153 0.0092 0.0153 0.0105
Debt val 0.0585 0.0747 0.0617 0.0750 0.0632 0.0751 0.0679 0.0751
Net firm val 0.0689 0.0799 0.0721 0.0810 0.0785 0.0844 0.0832 0.0857
Leverage 0.7625 0.8431 0.7719 0.8335 0.7112 0.7841 0.7256 0.7740
Perp. cr. spread 0.016 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.006 0.000
Measures at ρ = 0.15
Liquidity 0.0201 0.0225 0.0201 0.0228 0.0279 0.0286 0.0279 0.0286
Net equity val 0.0509 0.0472 0.0509 0.0478 0.0731 0.0692 0.0731 0.0704
Debt val 0.0659 0.0747 0.0677 0.0751 0.0686 0.0752 0.0711 0.0752
Net firm val 0.1168 0.1220 0.1186 0.1229 0.1417 0.1444 0.1443 0.1457
Leverage 0.4813 0.5171 0.4881 0.5152 0.4044 0.4346 0.4132 0.4315
Perp. cr. spread 0.008 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000
Measures at ρ = 0.20
Liquidity 0.0125 0.0127 0.0125 0.0127 0.0153 0.0165 0.0153 0.0165
Net equity val 0.0881 0.0846 0.0881 0.0852 0.1263 0.1226 0.1263 0.1238
Debt val 0.0667 0.0748 0.0683 0.0751 0.0692 0.0753 0.0715 0.0753
Net firm val 0.1549 0.1594 0.1565 0.1603 0.1956 0.1979 0.1979 0.1991
Perp. cr. spread 0.3985 0.4345 0.4044 0.4341 0.3282 0.3511 0.3356 0.3491
Leverage 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000
Measures at ρ = 0.25
Liquidity 0.0025 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024
Net equity val 0.1254 0.1218 0.1254 0.1224 0.1795 0.1758 0.1795 0.1770
Debt val 0.0670 0.0748 0.0686 0.0751 0.0695 0.0753 0.0718 0.0753
Net firm val 0.1925 0.1967 0.1941 0.1976 0.2491 0.2512 0.2513 0.2524
Leverage 0.3440 0.3757 0.3493 0.3757 0.2763 0.2970 0.2828 0.2956
Perp. cr. spread 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000
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TABLE 4
Liquidity holding versus no liquidity holding
Tax rate τ 30% 30% 0% 0%
Bankruptcy cost α 30% 5% 30% 5%
Firm holds liquidity reserve Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Measures at ρ = 0.10
Liquidity 0.0077 N/A 0.0077 N/A 0.0103 N/A 0.0103 N/A
Net equity val 0.0104 0.0069 0.0104 0.0069 0.0153 0.0099 0.0153 0.0099
Debt val 0.0638 0.0610 0.0696 0.0690 0.0707 0.0706 0.0792 0.0821
Net firm val 0.0743 0.0680 0.0800 0.0760 0.0860 0.0805 0.0946 0.0920
Leverage 0.7779 0.8981 0.7925 0.9088 0.7338 0.8770 0.7554 0.8923
Perp. cr. spread 0.010 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.003 -0.005
Equit volatility 1.1412 2.7108 1.1412 2.7108 1.1655 2.7096 1.1655 2.7096
Measures at ρ = 0.15
Liquidity 0.0201 N/A 0.0201 N/A 0.0279 N/A 0.0279 N/A
Net equity val 0.0509 0.0462 0.0509 0.0462 0.0731 0.0661 0.0731 0.0661
Debt val 0.0689 0.0671 0.0721 0.0719 0.0728 0.0728 0.0774 0.0797
Net firm val 0.1198 0.1133 0.1230 0.1182 0.1459 0.1390 0.1506 0.1458
Leverage 0.4924 0.5919 0.5038 0.6085 0.4187 0.5244 0.4338 0.5468
Perp. cr. spread 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
Equity volatility 0.3695 0.5898 0.3695 0.5898 0.3708 0.5897 0.3708 0.5897
Measures at ρ = 0.20
Liquidity 0.0125 N/A 0.0125 N/A 0.0153 N/A 0.0153 N/A
Net equity val 0.0881 0.0843 0.0881 0.0843 0.1263 0.1205 0.1263 0.1205
Debt val 0.0694 0.0677 0.0724 0.0722 0.0730 0.0731 0.0773 0.0795
Net firm val 0.1576 0.1521 0.1606 0.1566 0.1994 0.1936 0.2037 0.2000
Leverage 0.4081 0.4455 0.4182 0.4613 0.3402 0.3776 0.3530 0.3975
Perp. cr. spread 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
Equity volatility 0.2983 0.3595 0.2983 0.3595 0.3029 0.3595 0.3029 0.3595
Measures at ρ = 0.25
Liquidity 0.0025 N/A 0.0025 N/A 0.0025 N/A 0.0025 N/A
Net equity val 0.1254 0.1218 0.1254 0.1218 0.1795 0.1740 0.1795 0.1740
Debt val 0.0697 0.0680 0.0725 0.0723 0.0732 0.0732 0.0773 0.0794
Net firm val 0.1951 0.1898 0.1980 0.1941 0.2528 0.2472 0.2569 0.2534
Leverage 0.3527 0.3584 0.3620 0.3727 0.2868 0.2962 0.2981 0.3134
Perp. cr. spread 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003
Equity volatility 0.2612 0.2753 0.2612 0.2753 0.2621 0.2753 0.2621 0.2753
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TABLE 5
Analyzing Two Debt Covenants
Benchmark Debt holders claim liquidity C No dividend if ρt < f + q − L
(No covenant) C = 0.005 C = 0.010 L = 0.00 L = 0.02 L = 0.04
Measures at ρ = 0.05
Liquidity N/A N/A N/A 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Net equity val 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
Debt val 0.0104 0.0050 0.0204 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107
Net firm val 0.0104 0.0050 0.0204 0.0104 0.0104 0.0104
Leverage 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9998 0.9998 0.9998
Perp. cr. spread 0.369 0.840 0.159 0.359 0.359 0.359
Equit volatility N/A N/A N/A 3.4991 3.4991 3.4990
Measures at ρ = 0.10
Liquidity 0.0077 0.0116 0.0165 0.0073 0.0074 0.0077
Net equity val 0.0104 0.0094 0.0086 0.0100 0.0100 0.0101
Debt val 0.0585 0.0603 0.0600 0.0597 0.0597 0.0597
Net firm val 0.0690 0.0697 0.0687 0.0697 0.0697 0.0698
Leverage 0.7624 0.7407 0.7041 0.7748 0.7731 0.7703
Perp. cr. spread 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015
Equit volatility 1.1407 0.9634 0.7861 1.2195 1.2080 1.1900
Measures at ρ = 0.15
Liquidity 0.0201 0.0243 0.0293 0.0196 0.0197 0.0200
Net equity val 0.0509 0.0498 0.0487 0.0505 0.0505 0.0506
Debt val 0.0659 0.0669 0.0670 0.0669 0.0669 0.0669
Net firm val 0.1168 0.1167 0.1157 0.1175 0.1175 0.1175
Leverage 0.4814 0.4744 0.4620 0.4879 0.4875 0.4864
Perp. cr. spread 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Equity volatility 0.3695 0.3535 0.3351 0.3738 0.3732 0.3713
Measures at ρ = 0.20
Liquidity 0.0125 0.0156 0.0206 0.0115 0.0116 0.0126
Net equity val 0.0881 0.0870 0.0859 0.0878 0.0878 0.0879
Debt val 0.0667 0.0676 0.0677 0.0676 0.0676 0.0676
Net firm val 0.1549 0.1547 0.1537 0.1555 0.1555 0.1556
Leverage 0.3984 0.3972 0.3886 0.4049 0.4047 0.4024
Perp. cr. spread 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Equity volatility 0.2981 0.2924 0.2817 0.3023 0.3020 0.2990
Measures at ρ = 0.25
Liquidity 0.0025 0.0074 0.0124 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025
Net equity val 0.1254 0.1242 0.1231 0.1251 0.1251 0.1251
Debt val 0.0670 0.0680 0.0680 0.0679 0.0679 0.0679
Net firm val 0.1925 0.1922 0.1912 0.1931 0.1931 0.1931
Leverage 0.3440 0.3404 0.3341 0.3475 0.3475 0.3475
Perp. cr. spread 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Equity volatility 0.2612 0.2534 0.2461 0.2618 0.2618 0.2617
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Figure 1:
Equity and debt values, in terms of ρ and C, over the region S, for a benchmark example:
Panel A - Equity value, J:
’Fig1_splot_matrix’ using 2:1:4
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Panel B - Debt value, P :
’Fig1_splot_matrix’ using 2:1:5
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Figure 2:
Simulated time series of the profitability ρt, (top graph), and the liquidity reserve Ct, debt
valuePt, and total firm value Jt + Dt (all on the bottom graph, in increasing order). Note
that Jt represents a claim on the productive asset, and the liquidity reserve.
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Figure 3:
The regions D, I and S are depicted by dots, crosses (‘x’), and empty space, respectively.
The target liquid asset holding is the upper boundary of the S region. The realized liquid
asset holding, averaged over 300 simulations of the firm history, as a function of ρ, is depicted
by crosses (‘+’).
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Figure 4:
Here the crosses (“+”) represent the value of the equity in the benchmark example, when
the liquidity reserve is zero. Over the region where this is zero, the firm is bankrupt, and the
debt holders get 1 − α time the corresponding unlevered equity value, which is represented
by crosses (“x”). The stars represent the debt value in the benchmark case, for all levels of
liquidity.
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